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APPELLATE REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS IN
FEDERAL COURT: A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR
HANDLING PRIVILEGE CLAIMS
Cassandra Burke Robertson*
Abstract: The federal circuit courts of appeals have generally recognized that a party
suffers real hardship when the district court erroneously orders it to disclose privileged
information. Review of the disclosure order after final judgment is usually an insufficient
remedy; once the information has been disclosed, it can never again be fully confidential.
Consequently, the courts have struggled to provide a mechanism by which such orders can be
immediately appealed. However, privilege orders presenting novel questions of law or issues
of first impression do not clearly fit within the doctrinal requirements of the most common
methods of interlocutory review. Appellate courts have therefore applied varying exceptions
or extensions to those requirements in an effort to encompass such privilege orders within
them.
This Article proposes a two-tiered system of review to remedy the harm caused by
erroneous disclosure orders without stretching the current system of interlocutory review so
far that the benefits of the final judgment rule vanish. The Article recommends that review
begin in the district court with a motion to certify a discretionary appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), which requires a district court to certify an order that "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," if "an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation." If a district court refuses to certify an order even though it clearly satisfies the
requirements of § 1292(b), then the appellate court should exercise its mandamus power to
review the case. This two-tiered system of review would provide a consistent mechanism by
which the most difficult and important privilege orders could be immediately reviewed, but
would not impose too heavy a burden on the already-crowded appellate dockets.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a litigant in a civil case. Your adversary requests
discovery of some of your most sensitive information-your company's
trade secrets, records of conversations with your attorney, even
psychotherapy records. You assert a claim of privilege in an attempt to
resist discovery,' but the district court orders you to disclose this
1. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (establishing privileged matters); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing
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information and even denies your request for a protective order.
Complying with the disclosure order and waiting until after trial to
appeal the discovery decision will not help you; once the information is
made known, the damage is done. What do you do?
In many state courts, the answer is easy-you probably have a right
either to make an interlocutory appeal or to seek immediate review by
mandamus.2 In federal court, the answer is much more difficult. The
circuit courts are deeply split on the question of what-if any-type of
interlocutory review should be available to challenge an order requiring
the discovery of allegedly privileged information. Some courts require
you to disobey the order, stand in contempt of court and, if the court
issues a criminal contempt order, challenge the discovery ruling in an
appeal of the contempt order.3 Other courts allow you to file a
discretionary appeal, but only if you are one of the lucky few who can
persuade the district court and the circuit court to agree that your case
merits that appeal.4 Still other courts allow you to file an appeal as of
right under the collateral order doctrine, if your case meets certain
requirements.5 Finally, some courts might be willing to exercise their
authority to issue a writ of mandamus.6
parties to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or
defense of any party"). Although trade secrets are not technically considered to be privileged, they
may still be exempted from discovery and therefore are included within the scope of this paper. See
Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979); see also
Powers v. Chi. Transit Auth., 846 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1988) ("District courts have a
responsibility to protect sensitive information in discovery, where the utility of that information is
less than the injury its disclosure may do, even if the information is not technically privileged.").
2. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1994) § 2006 [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE] (noting that many states
allow mandamus review of discovery orders); Michael P. Shea & Alfred W.J. Marks, Life Without
Interlocutory Relief N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 2005, at S4 (Special Litigation Pullout Section) (noting that
New York allows an interlocutory appeal of discovery orders); see also, e.g., Ex parte Miltope
Corp., 823 So. 2d 640, 644-45 (Ala. 2001) ("If a trial court orders the discovery of trade secrets and
such are disclosed, the party resisting discovery will have no adequate remedy on appeal."); State ex
rel. Or. Health Scis. Univ. v. Haas, 942 P.2d 261, 264 (Or. 1997) ("Mandamus is an appropriate
remedy when a discovery order erroneously requires disclosure of a privileged communication.");
In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2005) (granting a writ of mandamus to
correct an erroneous privilege determination).
3. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 (1992); see also infra
Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974); see also infra Part
II.B.
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949) (permitting
review of interlocutory rulings that "finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral
to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
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With regard to mandamus proceedings-the most common vehicle
for immediate review-the circuits are divided on the requirements
necessary to obtain such review. Some courts have held that privilege
determinations can be reviewed by mandamus only in truly
extraordinary cases,7 while other courts have held that mandamus review
should be available whenever delayed review of a privilege ruling would
cause irreparable harm. 8 Similarly, when a case presents a privilege
question of first impression, the courts are split as to whether, in a
mandamus proceeding, they can apply an "ordinary error" standard of
review or whether they must apply the traditional "clear abuse of
discretion" test. 9
Given these inconsistencies, it is not surprising that some courts,
frustrated with the current scheme, have expressed a desire for greater
uniformity. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has written that
"[a]ppellate approaches to this topic are now so disparate that only
Congress or the Supreme Court could clear the air."10 Other courts have
similarly noted the inconsistent approaches."
This Article aims to provide an analytic framework by which the
federal courts can review rulings that deny privilege claims with greater
consistency. Part I describes the traditional "final judgment rule" and
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated"); see
also infra Part II.C.
6. See, e.g., Peck v. United States (In re United States), 397 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 2005)
("[T]his court, in accord with other circuits, has considered and issued writs of mandamus over
discovery orders implicating privilege claims."); see also infra Part II.D.
7. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir.
1992) (establishing a three-part test for mandamus review of discovery orders involving privilege
claims); In re W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 984 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with the
assertion that "even an erroneous application of the [common-interest] doctrine, if such should
occur, poses a significant risk of undermining the privilege"); see also infra Part II.D. 1.
8. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that mandamus is appropriate when a party can show that the district court has made a "clear and
indisputable" error in its privilege determination and can show that no other relief is available to
correct the harm caused by the erroneous order); see also infra Part lI.D. 1.
9. Compare Republic ofVenez. v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[N]o
writ of mandamus-whether denominated 'advisory,' 'supervisory,' or otherwise-will issue unless
the petitioner shows ... that the writ is necessary to amend a clear error or abuse of discretion.")
with In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e have some doubt
that the district court's order need be 'clearly' erroneous in supervisory mandamus cases where the
petition raises an important question of law of first impression, the answer to which would have a
substantial impact on the administration of the district courts."); see also infra Part ll.D.2.
10. Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).
11. See infra Part II.
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explains why the rule causes particular hardship in cases involving
questions of privilege. Part II outlines some of the conflicting
approaches the circuit courts use to ameliorate the harm caused by a
strict application of the final judgment rule. Part II further looks at the
current methods of interlocutory review, including review of litigation
sanctions, discretionary appeals, the Cohen collateral order doctrine, and
mandamus review. Part III discusses the problems caused by this circuit
split and analyzes the shortcomings of each of the current methods of
appellate review identified in Part II. Part IV describes some of the
statutory and rule changes recommended by other authors, including
proposals to increase the number of interlocutory appeals allowed as of
right, to provide appellate courts with greater discretion in determining
which appeals to allow, or to adopt a combination of those two
approaches. Part IV concludes that these changes would not provide
either an effective or an efficient method for handling appeals of
privilege denials. Finally, Part V recommends that privilege cases
involving novel questions of law-the cases that the current system has
the most trouble handling-be addressed through a two-step procedure
that combines discretionary appeal with mandamus review. It analyzes
both the advantages and limitations of that two-step approach, and
concludes that the two-step approach is better than current procedures at
meeting the appellate goals of error correction, uniformity, and fairness.
I. THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
Application of the final judgment rule, which defers appellate review
until the trial court has fully finished considering a case, prevents
immediate review of pre-trial and in-trial rulings. 12 Consequently, most
appeals do not begin until the trial court has fully completed its
involvement in a case.13 With a few exceptions, 14 federal circuit courts
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
13. Id. ("The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.").
14. Exceptions to the final judgment rule allow the appeal of interlocutory decisions granting or
denying an injunction, appointing a receiver, determining parties' rights in certain admiralty cases,
or certifying or refusing to certify a class action. See id. § 1292(a)(1), (2), and (3); FED. R. Civ. P.
23(f) ("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying class action certification under this rule if application is made to it within ten
days after entry of the order."). Additionally, in multi-party or multi-claim cases, a district court
may sever a party or claim from the case to allow immediate appeal of a final judgment as to that
party or claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ("When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
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of appeals may not review a case until the district court has reached a
"final decision,"' 5 defined as a ruling that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." 16
The final judgment rule offers a number of benefits. By denying
piecemeal appeals, it can speed the resolution of a case, and it can
reduce the opportunity for litigants to harass their adversaries through
the use of repeated appeals of interlocutory rulings.17 In addition, the
rule avoids some unnecessary appeals, since a party who loses an
interlocutory ruling but ultimately prevails in the case will ordinarily
have no need to appeal. 8 Likewise, the rule protects appellate court
dockets from being inundated with "housekeeping" matters from the
district courts, 19 and "enables the reviewing court to consider the trial
court's action in light of the entire proceedings below., 20 Finally, the
rule may even hasten the parties' acceptance of an inevitable result.
2
'
Although these benefits are substantial, the final judgment rule also
possesses some significant detriments with regard to discovery orders
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."). Other exceptions that may allow a court to
review privilege claims are discussed infra, Part II.
15. See§ 1291.
16. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
17. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). The Court stated that the final
judgment rule "avoid[s] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the
harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a
litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Id. The Court concluded: "To be
effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by
permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified cause." Id.
18. See Am. Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir.
1967).
19. Id.
20. Randall J. Turk, Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A Proposal to Amend
28 U.S.C. §1292, 67 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1979).
21. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 661 (1971). Rosenberg noted that a "hands off" policy of prohibiting
interlocutory review promotes finality, so that the adjudication "becomes accepted and the dispute
tranquilized" sooner. Id. By contrast, "[i]f every trial court order could be dragged up the appellate
ladder with some fair hope of reversal," termination of the dispute would be delayed. Id. at 662.
Injustice could also result if "the party with the deeper pocket" tried to wear down the opposing
party "by challenging every uncongenial ruling, whether made in the pleading, discovery, trial or
post-trial phases of the litigation." Id.
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involving claims of privilege. Because a party generally must wait until
the case is over before seeking review of pretrial discovery rulings, 22 it
can be difficult to obtain relief from an erroneous privilege ruling. For
example, if a district court judge erroneously rules that information is
not privileged-and therefore erroneously orders disclosure during
discovery-a party's compliance with that order may render the
discovery dispute moot and preclude a later appeal.23 Even if ancillary
questions prevent the privilege question itself from becoming moot, and
thus allow review of the privilege issue on appeal,24 the appellate court
usually will not be able to rectify all of the harm caused by the original
erroneous discovery order. As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out,
privileges protect against both the disclosure of private information and
the use of that information in litigation.25 If the district court incorrectly
rules that information is not privileged, full relief will be unavailable
after trial. Consequently, while the appellate court can require a new trial
in which the information is not used, the privileged material will have
already been disclosed and will no longer be fully confidential-"the cat
is out of the bag.",
26
Such disclosure can cause significant problems for parties. In one
case, for example, the district court ordered disclosure of "in-house
counsel's legal memorandum advising [the client] on the merits
of ... contract and tort claims"; 27 because the attorney's advice was
made available to an adverse party, it was used against the client in
subsequent litigation. 28 In addition to attorney-client confidences, the
mere disclosure of other privileged or confidential information can also
cause harm. Privacy is lost when medical records are disclosed,29
military promotion policy can be undermined if confidential officer
assessments are released to prospective candidates, 30 and a company's
22. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1987).
24. Even after trial, for example, a question may remain whether the allegedly privileged
information should have been admitted into evidence. See 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
§ 2006.
25. In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311,323-24 (5th Cir. 2003).
26. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
27. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 406 F.3d 867, 877 (7th Cir.
2005).
28. Id.
29. See In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
30. In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("If board members knew that
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competitive advantage could be lost if trade secrets were released to a
competitor.31 Even if available,32 protective orders that prohibit
disclosure outside of the lawsuit do not sufficiently protect the privilege
interest. 33 Disclosure to a party's adversary can often cause significant
harm, perhaps even the very harm that the privilege is designed to
protect against.34 Consequently, courts have noted that damage to
confidential interests is done "by the disclosure itself," even if the
privileged information is not used elsewhere or is later ruled
inadmissible at trial.35
The inability to obtain full relief for erroneous privilege rulings does
not sit well with the parties aggrieved by such rulings. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that constitutional due process does not provide
a right of appeal,36 parties' expectations of fairness and justice include
the notion that erroneous rulings can-and will-be corrected on
appeal.37 Parties expect both fairness as to the merits of the case (i.e.,
"arriving at correct decisions") and fairness in procedure (i.e., "arriving
at decisions correctly, in a manner that assures that litigants are, and feel
they are, treated fairly").38 Having the right to an appeal provides both; it
candidates passed over for promotion could gain access to board proceedings, that would clearly
inhibit frank assessment of candidates' relative strengths and weaknesses.").
31. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985).
32. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) ("[T]he court in which the action is pending ... may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense .... ").
33. See Coca-Cola, 107 F.R.D. at 290.
34. Id. ("[D]isclosure of trade secrets in litigation, even with the use of an appropriate protective
order, could 'become... the means of ruining an honest and profitable enterprise."' (quoting 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212, at 155 (McNaughton rev. 1961))); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In the case of the attomey-client
privilege ... a litigant claiming the privilege would probably prefer almost anyone other than
adversary counsel to review the documents in question. The attomeys'-eyes-only condition simply
does not limit disclosure to persons whose knowledge of the confidential communication is not
material to the purpose of the privilege. To the contrary, it allows one kind of critical disclosure-to
opposing counsel in litigation-that the privilege was designed to prevent.").
35. In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Mandatory disclosure of the
communications is the exact harm the privilege is meant to guard against, and this disclosure is not
remedied merely because a disclosed confidence is not used against the holder in a particular
case."); see also Chase Manhattan, 964 F.2d at 163--64.
36. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930) ("[T]he right of appeal
is not essential to due process, provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal
of first instance.").
37. Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 641-42.




gives appellate courts a second chance to get the merits of a case right,
and it reassures litigants that their case has been thoroughly considered.39
As a result, "the general right to press ahead most of the way to the top
adds to, and in recent tradition has been considered a fundamental part
of, the satisfaction that litigants are entitled to derive from the judicial
process., 40 By contrast, the concept of "unreviewable discretion"-the
idea that the trial court's ruling, even if wrong, will not be overturned-
"offends a deep sense of fitness in our view of the administration of
justice.,A The difficulty of obtaining appellate review of disclosure
orders therefore conflicts with litigants' basic sense of fairness and
undermines societal trust in the judicial process. 42
The final judgment rule therefore has both benefits and detriments.
With regard to disclosure orders, the detriments generally outweigh the
benefits. If a party is unable to secure interlocutory review and complies
with the disclosure order, that compliance may render the issue moot and
therefore unreviewable after final judgment. Furthermore, compliance
with the disclosure order can cause substantial harm to the party giving
up its confidential information. As a result, litigants may reasonably feel
that the unavailability of interlocutory review creates a real injustice.
II. VARIED METHODS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Given the hardships caused by the final judgment rule in cases
involving privilege claims, and given society's expectation that
erroneous decisions will be reversed on appeal, it is not surprising that
appellate courts have frequently recognized a need to resolve privilege
questions before a final judgment is entered. The Third Circuit, for
example, has written that "[wihen a district court orders production of
information over a litigant's claim of a privilege not to disclose, appeal
after a final decision is an inadequate remedy .... [T]o delay review in
39. See, e.g., SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES 12
(1999) (conducting an empirical study of why people appeal, describing a "process-based approach"
in which litigants appeal because they seek "to be heard fairly," and concluding that a fair hearing
may meet their appellate goals "even if the subsequent outcome is negative").
40. Dalton, supra note 38, at 67-68.
41. Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 641-42.
42. Cf Dalton, supra note 38, at 67 ("This appreciation of the value of participation is manifested
in the appeals process as we hold ourselves ready to honor the litigant's classic boast: 'If need be,
I'll take this case all the way to the Supreme Court."').
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such cases is to deny it altogether., 43 Other circuits have agreed that
appeal only after final judgment is inadequate in privilege cases.4 4
Even though the courts tend to agree that immediate review of
privilege cases is desirable, they sharply diverge in how they provide
that review. In some cases, a party must risk litigation sanctions in order
to preserve a privilege claim. 45 In others, a party may seek review by
pursuing a discretionary appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).46 Finally,
some courts allow review either through the Cohen collateral order
doctrine47 or by mandamus proceedings. 48 The circuits, however, are
sharply divided on the requirements for and availability of each of these
review mechanisms.
A. Litigation Sanctions
The oldest method of seeking immediate review of privilege
determinations required that a party risk litigation sanctions.49 A party
who wanted to contest the district court's order to disclose information
would refuse to comply.5° If the litigant was cited for criminal contempt,
the contempt judgment could be immediately appealed, 51 and the court
would review the privilege question when deciding whether contempt
was an appropriate sanction. 52 Alternatively, if the court granted a
default judgment as a discovery sanction, that judgment could also be
appealed, and the appellate court would review the privilege
determination in deciding whether the default judgment was warranted.53
43. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984).
44. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("As
our prior cases have repeatedly noted, 'appeal after final judgment is obviously not adequate in
[privilege] cases-the cat is out of the bag."' (alteration in original) (quoting In re England, 375
F.3d 1169, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2004))); see also Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th
Cir. 2005); Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989).
45. See infra Part II.A.
46. See infra Part lI.B.
47. See infra Part II.C.
48. See infra Part II.D.
49. See Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
50. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 (1992).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958); Newman v. Metro.
Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A plaintiffs failure to comply with
discovery orders is properly sanctioned by dismissal of the suit, a defendant's by entry of a default
judgment."); Dole v. Local 1942, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).
Vol. 81:733, 2006
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Conversely, if the district court denied discovery, a party could
challenge a denial that resulted in dismissal of the case.54 If plaintiffs
could not prove their claims without using the allegedly privileged
information, the district court might dismiss the case after refusing the
discovery, and the appellate court could then review the privilege
determination when the dismissal was appealed. 5  In some cases,
however, a district court would sanction a party through civil contempt
rather than criminal contempt.56 Unlike a criminal contempt order, a
civil contempt order is not immediately appealable,57 so immediate
review was therefore impossible even if a party was willing to risk
contempt.
The circuits currently disagree about whether a party facing the
possibility of civil contempt must still risk a contempt judgment in order
to preserve a privilege claim.58 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that interlocutory review of discovery orders should generally be
available only through contempt orders, 59 the Court has not addressed
54. Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 828 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Id. ("Here the denial of the motion for discovery was the very basis for the order of dismissal
and is thus reviewable.").
56. A civil contempt order is designed to coerce compliance, while a criminal contempt order is
designed to punish a party for non-compliance. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368
(1966). District courts are instructed to "first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through
the imposition of civil contempt," and to "resort to criminal sanctions only after [the trial judge]
determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." Id. at 372 n.9.
57. United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
58. Compare id. (allowing a collateral order appeal and noting that "we have expressed concern
that a party that seeks review does not know in advance 'whether refusal to comply with the
discovery order will result in a civil contempt order or a criminal contempt order') with In re State
& County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 138 F. App'x 539, 540 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying a writ of prohibition
because "another avenue of relief appears to be available to State and County: it could refuse to
comply with the May 6, 2005 Order and appeal from any contempt sanction imposed by the district
court").
59. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.1l (1992) ("A party that
seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of appeals must refuse
compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order."). The U.S. Supreme Court
has created two exceptions to this rule. It did not require the President of the United States to seek a
contempt judgment in order to obtain review. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974)
("[T]he traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly inappropriate due to the
unique setting in which the question arises. To require a President of the United States to place
himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism
for review of the ruling would be unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occasion for
constitutional confrontation between two branches of the Government."). The Court has also created
an exception for situations in which the discovery order is aimed at a party other than the party who
claims the privilege. Id. (stating that the third-party exception was added because it was "unlikely
that the third party would risk a contempt citation in order to allow immediate review of the
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the issue of whether a party must risk civil, as well as criminal,
contempt. Some circuit courts have suggested that the U.S. Supreme
Court would not require a party to risk incurring a civil contempt
judgment, as litigants are often powerless to control whether
disobedience would lead to the issuance of an immediately appealable
criminal contempt order or a non-appealable civil contempt order.60 This
view may be correct; the Court has stated in dicta that the contempt
requirement may not apply when "denial of immediate review would
render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's claims,, 61 as
could be the case if the court entered a non-appealable civil contempt
order. Other circuits, however, still require parties to refuse compliance
and face litigation sanctions in order to protect an assertion of
privilege.62
B. Discretionary Appeal
In 1958, Congress added an additional method for obtaining
interlocutory review in certain cases by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).63
This provision allows an interlocutory appeal to be taken in a civil case
if both the district court and the appellate court agree that an
interlocutory order meets several requirements:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in
writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if
appellant's claim of privilege").
60. Philip Morris, 314 F.3d at 620.
61. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
62. E.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 474
(6th Cir. 2006) ("If HCA seeks to challenge the propriety of the district court's order, it may disobey
the order and suffer a contempt citation."); see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 681 (1958); In re State & County, 138 F. App'x at 540; Dole v. Local 1942, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1989).
63. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292).
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application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the
order... 64
In theory, this provision looks as if it could solve the problem of
interlocutory privilege rulings. A "controlling question of law" has
generally been held to "encompass at the very least every order which, if
erroneous, would be reversible error on final appeal. 65 Even though a
noted civil procedure treatise found it "difficult to believe that a
discovery order will present a controlling question of law,, 66 many
discovery orders have presented just such questions. For example, cases
have addressed whether the corporate attorney-client privilege extends
only to top-level management or whether it also extends to lower-level
employees who seek legal guidance,67 whether a habeas petitioner who
asserts actual innocence must waive attorney-client privilege,68 whether
the names and addresses of patients in a hospital are protected medical
records,69 whether an invention record can constitute a "request for legal
advice" so as to be protected by attorney-client privilege, 70 and whether
a corporation can invoke attorney-client privilege against a
stockholder. 71 Each of these determinations could affect the outcome of
a case, and would therefore be at least theoretically appealable after final
judgment-even though a reversal at that time might not fully cure the
harm caused by the erroneous order.72
In those cases in which privilege claims do present a controlling issue
of law, privilege issues are also likely to satisfy the remaining conditions
of § 1292(b). Where there is a significant likelihood for reversal on
appeal, there is also "substantial ground for difference of opinion., 73 In
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
65. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Ex parte Tokio
Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963). But see United States v. Woodbury, 263
F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that a privilege claim did not present a "controlling question
of law" because the privilege issue did not go to the merits of the litigation and concluding instead
that the "issues of this lawsuit and the ability of the court to render a binding decision therein are in
no way affected by the order to produce documents").
66. 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 2006.
67. See In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2003).
68. See In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 450--52 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub norn. Houk v. Lott, 126
S. Ct. 1772 (2006).
69. See In re Fink, 876 F.2d 84, 85 (1 th Cir. 1989).
70. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805-06 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
71. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); see also Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167, 172
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those cases, an interlocutory ruling is also likely to "advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. 74 Sometimes a definitive ruling that key
information is non-discoverable will result in immediate dismissal of the
case.75 Other times, even if the ruling does not result in dismissal, it may
hasten the end of the litigation by reducing the risk that, if the privilege
ruling were reversed on appeal, a second trial would need to be held.76
C. The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine
The Cohen collateral order doctrine permits review of interlocutory
rulings that "finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 77 An
order that meets these requirements is treated as a final order,78 so it is
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unlike discretionary
appeals under § 1292(b), a § 1291 appeal does not depend on the
willingness of either the trial or appellate courts to accept the case, but
instead allows the aggrieved party to take an appeal as of right.79 The
U.S. Supreme Court has identified three requirements for an order to be
eligible for an interlocutory appeal under Cohen: it must
(1) "conclusively determine the disputed question," (2) "resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and
(3) be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 80
The circuits are deeply split as to whether a party can use the
collateral order doctrine to appeal disclosure orders at all. At this time,
(S.D. 11.), aff-d, 283 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1959) (stating that the standard is "synonymous with a
substantial likelihood that appellant's position would prevail on appeal").
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
75. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1096.
76. See Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
advancement requirement is satisfied when a resolution of the legal question "could accelerate the
disposition of many pieces of litigation"), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1147 (2005); In re Boise Cascade
Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (noting that the advancement requirement is
satisfied when an interlocutory ruling could avoid the need for a re-trial).
77. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); see also Will v.
Hallock, 126 S. Ct. 952, 957 (2006).
78. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (providing that "Itlhe courts of appeals. . . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States").
80. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see also Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (quoting same text from Coopers & Lybrand).
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the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
held that such orders are not appealable under the Cohen collateral order
doctrine.81 On the other hand, the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
agreed that interlocutory orders addressing a claim of privilege can meet
the Cohen requirements.82  The Eighth Circuit has noted the
disagreement without deciding whether it would allow an immediate
appeal of a privilege ruling under Cohen.
83
This circuit split is fairly recent. Before 1997, courts had generally
disallowed interlocutory appeals of discovery determinations, 84 and any
interlocutory appeal of a privilege order was therefore extremely rare.
When it did occur, it tended to be in unusual situations, such as cases in
which the allegedly privileged material was in the hands of a third party
who had no incentive to risk a contempt judgment.85
In 1989, the Third Circuit was one of the first to suggest that a party
could appeal discovery orders requiring the production of allegedly
81. See FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 458-60 & n.2 (lst Cir. 2000); Chase Manhattan
Bank N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1992); Peck v. United States
(In re United States), 680 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The assertion of a privilege... does not
convert what would otherwise be an interlocutory discovery ruling... into a collateral, and
therefore appealable, order."); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 2003);
MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 120 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994); Texaco, Inc. v.
Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 995 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 448
n.2 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Houk v. Lott, 126 S. Ct. 1772 (2006) (observing that
mandamus is "more appropriate" than the collateral order doctrine to review interlocutory privilege
rulings but not directly ruling on whether a particular privilege order could be collateral); Dellwood
Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A] discovery order is not
deemed collateral even if it is an order denying a claim of privilege."); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10
F.3d 746, 750 (10th Cir. 1993).
82. Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.,
110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997); see also In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 618-21 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Pearson v. Miller, 211
F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cit. 2000) ("An order denying the applicability of a claimed privilege conclusively
determines the question, and does so in a way that is effectively unreviewable: once released,
information has lost a measure of confidentiality that can never fully be regained.").
83. See Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1093 (8th Cir.
2005) ("Other circuits have applied the collateral order doctrine to permit immediate appeal of pre-
trial discovery orders only in exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as when the discovery order
would compel the production of allegedly privileged information.").
84. See Texaco, Inc. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 995 F.2d 43, 44 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993);
see also Nicole E. Paolini, Comment, The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine: The Proper Vehicle
for Interlocutory Appeal of Discovery Orders, 64 TUL. L. REV. 215, 230-32 (1989).
85. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.I1 (1992) ("[A] discovery
order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order
because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by
refusing compliance." (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918))).
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confidential information under the Cohen doctrine. s6 In Smith v. BIC
Corp.,87 the Third Circuit relied on Cohen to conclude that a corporation
could immediately appeal the required disclosure of information alleged
to contain trade secrets. 88 The court held that the discovery order met
each of the three Cohen requirements because: (1) the order
"conclusively determine[d]" that BIC must disclose the information;
(2) the issue was unrelated to the merits because the court could
"evaluate whether or not a design is a trade secret without reaching the
merits of whether or not it is a defective design"; and (3) the order would
be effectively unreviewable on appeal "because once trade secrets are
made public, they can obviously never be 'secrets' again. '89
In the immediate wake of BIC, few courts applied the collateral order
doctrine to discovery orders. But after the Third Circuit reiterated its
position in Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.,90 concluding that an order requiring
disclosure of information allegedly protected by the attorney-client and
work-product privileges could be immediately appealed, 91 other courts
began to rely on the collateral order doctrine to permit interlocutory
appeals of privilege questions. The D.C. Circuit was the first to follow
the Ford Motor Co. rule.92 In United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.,93 it
noted that contempt was not a reliable way to secure interlocutory
appellate review of a discovery order, as civil contempt judgments were
not appealable and "a party that seeks review does not know in advance
whether refusal to comply with the discovery order will result in a civil
contempt order or a criminal contempt order." 94 Because the court
believed an interlocutory appeal was the only way that the party could
obtain "effective review" of the discovery order, it allowed the appeal to
go forward under the Cohen doctrine, concluding that each of the three
prongs could be met in a privilege claim.
95
86. Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989).
87. 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989).
88. id. at 198-99.
89. Id.
90. 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997).
91. Id.; see also Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co, 211 F.3d 52, 53-55 (3d Cir. 2000); Montgomery
County v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 1999) (attorney-client and work product
privileges).
92. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
93. 314 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2003).




The Ninth Circuit followed similar logic in Agster v. Maricopa
County,96 where the district court ordered Maricopa County to release a
mortality-review report, but the county claimed that the report was
privileged under a medical peer-review privilege.97 The court noted that
it had not yet "resolved the general question of whether a discovery
order disposing of an asserted claim of privilege could be independently
appealed under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen."98 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the order would be appealable under the
particular circumstances presented in Agster-specifically, when
disclosure would affect trial strategy and therefore, "[e]ven if a new trial
were ordered at which the material found to be privileged was not
admissible, it might be impossible to undo the effects of the disclosure
with regard to the information in plaintiffs' hands and its effect on their
trial strategy." 99 Given how often information subject to a privilege
claim could affect "trial strategy," it seems likely that the Ninth Circuit
would allow a Cohen appeal to be brought in a wide variety of privilege
cases.
In short, Cohen appeals of disclosure orders are rarely allowed.
Courts that do allow them-in particular, the Third, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits-rely most heavily on Cohen's third prong, that effective
review would be unavailable after a final judgment. 100 Other circuits,
however, have refused to apply Cohen to discovery orders, with some
noting that Cohen's separability requirement precludes an interlocutory
appeal of the privilege determination. 01
96. 422 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2005).
97. Id. at 838.
98. Id. at 838-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997); Agster, 422 F.3d at 838-39;
United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
101. See, e.g., MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]his
appeal cannot be considered apart from the course of the main litigation, a necessary prerequisite for
application of the collateral order doctrine."); Peck v. United States (In re United States), 680 F.2d
9, 12 (2d Cit. 1982) ("[T]he discovery ruling in this case is 'integral to, rather than "completely
separate from,"' the merits of the action. Peck seeks to discover relevant information from a party
opponent in civil litigation." (quoting In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1979))).
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D. Mandamus
When no interlocutory appeal is available, a disclosure order may
sometimes be reviewed through mandamus. 10 2 Appellate courts have the
power to review district court orders through the exercise of the writ of
mandamus, which "compel[s] a lower court... to perform mandatory or
purely ministerial duties correctly."'' 0 3 The power to issue a writ of
mandamus comes from the All Writs Act, 10 4 which provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."' 0 5 In effect,
mandamus review is "best understood as akin to an interlocutory appeal,
a means to procure interlocutory review of a district court order.' 0 6
Mandamus review is available only as a last resort, when no other
interlocutory review is available.'°7
A number of courts have used their mandamus power to review
disclosure orders, 0 8 but, as with Cohen appeals, appellate courts are split
102. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 3935.3.
103. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
105. Id.
106. Leah Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Attorney
Disqualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 678 (2005).
107. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 505 (1979) ("The general principle which governs
proceedings by mandamus is, that whatever can be done without the employment of that
extraordinary writ, may not be done with it. It lies only when there is practically no other remedy."
(quoting Exparte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 617 (1882))).
108. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 3935.3; see also Peck v. United States (In re United
States), 397 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[T]his court, in accord with other circuits, has
considered and issued writs of mandamus over discovery orders implicating privilege claims.");
United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, 277 F.3d 969, 981 (7th Cir. 2002), affd, 538 U.S.
119 (2003); In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re GMC,
153 F.3d 714, 715 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Where the district court has.., rejected a claim of attorney-
client privilege, [we] will issue a writ of mandamus when the party seeking the writ has no other
adequate means to attain the desired relief and the district court's ruling is clearly erroneous.");
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992); In re
Fink, 876 F.2d 84, 85 (11th Cir. 1989); Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1982)
("While mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and should be limited to exceptional cases, courts
have recognized that when a district court orders production of information over a litigant's claim of
a privilege not to disclose, appeal after a final decision is an inadequate remedy; in these
circumstances, an appellate court may exercise its mandamus power and consider the merits of the
claimed privilege.") (citation omitted); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th
Cir. 1971), affid, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492
(7th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause maintenance of the attorney-client privilege
up to its proper limits has substantial importance to the administration of justice, and because an
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over the propriety of mandamus review of discovery orders.
Specifically, some circuits allowing Cohen review of certain privilege
orders also allow review by mandamus in limited cases.10 9 In addition,
some courts that do not necessarily permit Cohen review will instead
allow review by mandamus." 0 At least one circuit prefers to review such
claims under Cohen rather than through mandamus.11' Finally, two
circuits do not generally allow either Cohen review or mandamus review
of privilege orders. 1
2
The controversy over mandamus review of discovery orders stems
from the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has admonished the appellate
courts that mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy," to be used in "only
exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power,'
or a 'clear abuse of discretion.""'1 3 But the Court has not given clear
guidance on just how exceptional those circumstances need to be before
mandamus is justified. The Court has identified three conditions that
must be met before a writ of mandamus can be issued. 1 4 First, "the party
seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to
attain the relief he desires."' 1 5 Second, the petitioner's right to the writ
must be "clear and indisputable."" 6 Finally, "even if the first two
prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its
discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances."1 7 The first two conditions are relatively clear, but the
third is less so. Consequently, the circuits disagree on when mandamus
appeal after disclosure of the privileged communication is an inadequate remedy, the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus is appropriate."); Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, Cent. Div., 287 F.2d
324, 331 (9th Cir. 1961).
109. In the Ninth Circuit, see Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Cohen) and Hartley, 287 F.2d at 331 (mandamus). In the Third Circuit, see Kelly v. Ford Motor
Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997) (Cohen) and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer v. Home Indemnity Co.,
32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) (mandamus).
110. See In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 448 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Bankamerica Corp. Sec. Litig.,
270 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001).
111. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003); Bennett v. City
of Boston, 54 F.3d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1995).
113. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Will v. United States, 389
U.S. 90, 95 (1967) and Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)).
114. Id. at 380-81.
115. Id. at 380 (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
116. Id. at 381.
117. Id. (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
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is "appropriate under the circumstances"-and particularly whether it is
appropriate to resolve a discovery dispute based on an alleged
privilege.118 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that mandamus is
an appropriate remedy in the most unusual and high-profile cases, such
as a discovery dispute in which the Vice President is a party and
substantial questions involving the separation of powers are at stake." 9
The Court left as an open question, however, whether mandamus would
be appropriate to resolve a more ordinary discovery dispute. 1
20
1. Circuits are Split as to the "Extraordinariness" of Privilege Cases
Unsurprisingly, circuits have differed in their analysis of whether
privilege disputes are sufficiently "extraordinary" to warrant mandamus
relief.12 Some courts have held that when the first two elements have
been met-that is, when a party can show that the district court has made
a "clear and indisputable" error in its privilege determination and can
show that no other relief is available to correct the harm caused by the
erroneous order, mandamus is appropriate. 122 The Third Circuit, for
example, has held that once the first two requirements have been
satisfied, the third is also satisfied, 123 concluding that "[m]andamus may
properly be used as a means of immediate appellate review of orders
compelling the disclosure of documents and information claimed to be
protected from disclosure by privilege or other interests in
confidentiality."'' 24 The Third Circuit's test focuses on the potential harm
to the petitioners if review is denied, and allows mandamus review when
the petitioners would face "grave injustice" if interlocutory review were
denied. 125 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that "forced
118. Compare In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[lit is established that
mandamus is an appropriate means of relief if a district court errs in ordering the discovery of
privileged documents, as such an order would not be reviewable on appeal.") with In re
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 666 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1981) ("The rule is firmly and universally
established that mandamus cannot be used to challenge ordinary discovery orders.").
119. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381-82.
120. Id. at 381.
121. 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 3935.3, at 606-08 n.6.
122. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984) ("We caution that
mandamus is not to be used as an ordinary vehicle to obtain interlocutory relief from discovery
orders. It is, however, available when necessary to prevent grave injustice.").
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disclosure of privileged material may bring about irreparable harm," and
has held that mandamus is the only method by which a party ordered to
disclose privileged material may obtain relief.126 The Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted this view.127 The Ninth
Circuit has even written that mandamus can be available in "an ordinary
case"-not just an unusual one or a "cause celebre"-when "ordinary
remedies are inadequate" and circumstances "require the issuance of an
extraordinary writ to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice."'128
Conversely, the Second Circuit has expressed more reluctance to
allow review by mandamus. 129 It has suggested that irreparable harm to
the litigants is not enough by itself, and has instead held that courts
should consider the importance of the legal question raised as well as the
possibility of irreparable injury. 130 The court developed a three-part test
for discovery orders involving privilege claims, concluding that
mandamus review is appropriate when: "(i) an issue of importance and
of first impression is raised; (ii) the privilege will be lost in the particular
case if review must await a final judgment; and (iii) immediate
resolution will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine
undermining the privilege."'
' 3 1
The Second Circuit's test is narrower than the standard applied by the
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits; thus, the
Second Circuit will sometimes deny relief when those circuits would
126. In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Chesher v. Allen, 122 F.
App'x 184, 187 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It is also important to note that this court has a more flexible
approach to mandamus than other circuits.... [W]e have said that mandamus is particularly
appropriate to review discovery decisions that would not be appealable until final judgment,
especially decisions related to privileges."). But see United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes
Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir. 2006).
127. See In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[lI]t is established that
mandamus is an appropriate means of relief if a district court errs in ordering the discovery of
privileged documents, as such an order would not be reviewable on appeal."); In re Bankamerica
Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Though mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, we will issue the writ when the district court has committed a clear error of law or abuse of
discretion in ordering the disclosure of privileged materials."); Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court,
287 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1961); In re Fink, 876 F.2d 84, 84 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("In the context of
discovery orders which will compromise a claim of privilege or invasion of privacy rights,
mandamus has been found appropriate .... [lI]f there has been a clear abuse of discretion in
allowing discovery, mandamus is an appropriate remedy.") (citation omitted).
128. Hartley Pen, 287 F.2d at 328.





not.132 For example, the Second Circuit declined to review a case in
which an insurance company sought discovery of documents prepared
by its insured's outside counsel. 133 The district court had concluded that,
even though the insurance company was denying coverage, it had
enough of a "common interest" with its insured to defeat the attorney-
client privilege. 134 The Second Circuit acknowledged that "the contours
of the 'common interest' doctrine are significant and deserve careful
consideration in the varied circumstances that may arise in relationships
between an insured and its insurer.'' 35 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that it did not believe either that the "determination of the doctrine's
applicability... presents such a novel and important issue as to warrant
mandamus review," or that "even an erroneous application of the
doctrine, if such should occur, poses a significant risk of undermining
the privilege."' 136 The court therefore denied mandamus without regard
to the merits of the underlying discovery order.' 37 The Tenth Circuit has
followed the Second Circuit's more rigorous standard, and the Federal
Circuit has also cited it approvingly.' 38 Finally, the Sixth Circuit has also
recently focused on the "extraordinary situations" prong of mandamus
review in this area, denying mandamus when a privilege claim was not
sufficiently extraordinary. 1
39
The First and Fourth Circuits have rejected the other circuits' more
lenient standard and seem to be even stricter than the Second Circuit. 140
132. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 261 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Mandamus is a remedy
rarely granted by this Court. 'Unlike other circuits, we have rarely used the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to overturn a discovery order involving a claim of privilege."') (quoting Chase
Manhattan, 964 F.2d at 163); In re W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 984 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1993).
133. In re W.R. Grace, 984 F.2d at 589.
134. Id. at 588.
135. Id. at 589.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See In re The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
a case involving attorney-client privilege met the "rigorous requirements" laid out by the Second
Circuit); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 1993) ("With discovery orders
involving a claim of privilege we require both that the disclosure render impossible any meaningful
appellate review of the claim and that the disclosure involves questions of substantial importance to
the administration of justice."); Barclaysamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir.
1984) (requiring "a question of substantial importance to the administration of justice" beyond the
privilege question itself).
139. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 472-74
(6th Cir. 2006).
140. See In re State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 138 F. App'x 539, 540 (4th Cir. 2005); Bennett
v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Underwriters at Lloyd's, 666 F.2d 55, 58
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They have refused to exercise their mandamus authority in privilege
cases no less compelling than cases in which the other circuits have
granted relief.141 This reluctance even extended to a case in which the
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that there was an important question of
first impression relating to governmental privilege in a case involving
issues of national security.
42
2. Courts Disagree Over the Degree of Error Necessary for
Mandamus Relief
Although many of the circuits use the writ of mandamus to review
privilege claims, these claims do not easily fit into the doctrinal
standards that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for mandamus
actions. The Court has said repeatedly that mandamus is appropriate
only in cases involving judicial "usurpation of power" or "a clear abuse
of discretion., 143 The Court has also suggested that mandamus may be
available "to settle important issues of first impression";44 this type of
review is generally referred to as "advisory mandamus."' 145 There is
(4th Cir. 1981).
141. See Bennett, 54 F.3d at 21 (assuming without deciding that some discovery orders could be
"sufficiently exceptional to warrant mandamus relief," but nonetheless concluding that the district
attorney's claim of qualified privilege against compelled government disclosure of sensitive
investigative techniques did not meet the mandamus standard in that case); In re Underwriters, 666
F.2d at 58 ("The rule is firmly and universally established that mandamus cannot be used to
challenge ordinary discovery orders."); In re State & County, 138 F. App'x at 540 (acknowledging
that mandamus is a "drastic and extraordinary" remedy).
142. United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003). In Moussaoui, the Fourth
Circuit faced the question of whether the government had to produce a potentially exculpatory
witness for deposition in a criminal trial based on terrorism charges, even though the government
asserted that producing the witness for deposition would have "devastating consequences for
national security and foreign relations." Id. at 512. The district court had ordered that the witness be
produced for a deposition, concluding that "Moussaoui and the public's interest in a fair trial
outweighed the Government's national security interest in precluding access to the enemy
combatant witness." Id. at 513. The Fourth Circuit concluded that mandamus review of that decision
was inappropriate, not because the issue was unimportant, but instead because it was difficult, and
therefore the government could not show that its right to the writ was "clear and undisputable." Id.
at 517 (The "substantive issues involved... are complex and difficult, and the answer is not easily
discerned.").
143. See Cheney v. U.S Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).
144. Id. at 391; see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964) (noting that there was
an allegation of usurpation as to one question and holding that the Court's mandamus review would
extend to a second issue "to avoid piecemeal litigation and to settle new and important problems").
145. Michael W. McConnell, Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for
Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 475 (1978).
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disagreement, however, about whether the existence of an important
issue of first impression can substitute for the Court's requirement that
there be either a clear abuse of discretion or a usurpation of power.
46
This distinction is especially important in privilege cases, which often
raise novel issues or questions of first impression.) 47
The advantage of the "clear abuse of discretion" test 48 is that it "does
not require appellate courts to probe extensively into the merits of a
case." 149 If competing considerations must be weighed, or difficult
questions prevent the district court's privilege determination from being
clearly erroneous, then the appellate court will deny mandamus relief. 50
When courts apply the "clear abuse of discretion" test to issues of first
impression on mandamus review, they generally measure that abuse of
discretion with the benefit of hindsight.15' In such cases, the appellate
146. Compare Republic of Venez. v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("[N]o writ of mandamus-whether denominated 'advisory,' 'supervisory,' or otherwise-will
issue unless the petitioner shows ... that the writ is necessary to amend a clear error or abuse of
discretion.") with In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e have
some doubt that the district court's order need be 'clearly' erroneous in supervisory mandamus
cases where the petition raises an important question of law of first impression, the answer to which
would have a substantial impact on the administration of the district courts."); see also Note,
Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595, 615 & n.86
(1973) [hereinafter Mandamus and the All Writs Act] ("Schlagenhauf. . . left no room in the area of
advisory mandamus for a requirement of degree of error.").
147. Maryellen Fullerton, Exploring the Far Reaches of Mandamus, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 1131,
1152 (1983) ("Those rare cases where discovery rulings require mandamus relief, however,
generally present novel questions concerning federal rules of procedure and therefore call forth the
advisory mandamus power of the appellate court."). Most privilege disputes will require
determination of discoverability under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that parties may only obtain discovery of matters "not privileged."
148. Although some circuit courts use the term "clear error" as a synonym for "abuse of
discretion," the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the latter term is preferable to describe the
deferential standard of review applied to a trial court's entry of a discretionary order. Omelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694 n.3 (1996) ("While the Seventh Circuit uses the term 'clear error'
to denote the deferential standard applied when reviewing determinations of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, we think the preferable term is 'abuse of discretion.' 'Clear error' is a term of art
derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing
questions of fact."). See also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that, in order to be subject to mandamus review, "the order must so far exceed the proper
bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in character, or in violation
of a clear and indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently erroneous").
149. Christina Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue
Transfer Orders, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 715, 721 (1991).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
151. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530, 536 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) ("In order to decide
whether 'clear error as a matter of law' exists, we must first examine what the law is, before
deciding whether the district court clearly departed from it."); Mandamus and the All Writs Act,
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court will both establish the parameters of a new legal doctrine and
apply it to the case at hand. For example, in In re Lott,'52 the Sixth
Circuit addressed the question of whether a habeas petitioner claiming
actual innocence should be required to waive attorney-client privilege.1
53
Once the court decided that attorney-client privilege need not be waived,
it concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering
privileged materials to be disclosed and granted the writ to order the
district court to vacate its order compelling discovery.1
54
Some courts, however, do not use the "clear abuse of discretion" test
at all when a mandamus petition presents an issue of first impression,
but instead apply only an "ordinary error" standard. 5 5 This lower
standard will not likely affect the appellate court's review of the trial
court's factual findings, as appellate courts review such findings only for
clear error even in an ordinary appeal. 156 Similarly, it will not affect the
legal standard articulated by the appellate court, as legal determinations
are made de novo. 157 Applying a lower "ordinary error" standard on
mandamus review will, however, affect the appellate court's analysis of
whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts, as the
standard of review to be applied to such a determination varies
according to the type of proceeding.1
5 8
The degree of deference given to the trial court's application of the
law to the facts may have a dispositive effect in some cases. For
example, even though communications can lose their privileged status
through disclosure, some courts have established a legal rule that the
privilege will remain intact if the disclosure was merely inadvertent or
supra note 146, at 600 (noting that clear error could exist even when "the merits of the controversy
had been very much in issue up until the time the Court decided to issue the writ").
152. 424 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005).
153. Id. at 452-56.
154. Id. at 456.
155. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e have some doubt
that the district court's order need be 'clearly' erroneous in supervisory mandamus cases where the
petition raises an important question of law of first impression .... ), aff'd by absence of quorum
sub aim. Arizona v. U.S. Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983).
156. Venegas-Hemandez v. Asociacion de Compositores y Editores de Musica Latinoamericana,
424 F.3d 50, 53 (1 st Cir. 2005) ("The standard of review is de novo for issues of law, clear error for





unintentional. 15 9 In ruling on a mandamus petition, the appellate court
can formulate a rule of law that the inadvertent disclosure will not waive
privilege. The court's application of that rule, however, will depend on
the degree of deference given to the district court's decision: will the
appellate court consider de novo whether the particular disclosure was
sufficiently inadvertent to maintain its privileged character? Or will it
defer to the district court's determination of that issue, reversing only if
the district court clearly erred in finding the disclosure insufficiently
inadvertent, and thus clearly abused its discretion in ordering discovery?
The appellate court's answer to this question may determine whether it
orders the district court to vacate the discovery order. 160 As a result, the
different standards applied by the circuits lead to different results.
E. Summary
The circuits' varying approaches to the appealability of privilege
determinations reflect a deep circuit split in need of resolution. Some
litigants will only be able to secure interlocutory review if they first
stand in contempt of court, refusing to comply with the district court's
disclosure order. But, in the circuits that broadly apply the Cohen
collateral order doctrine to privilege determinations, litigants will
generally have an absolute right to an interlocutory appeal of certain
privilege determinations. Finally, in circuits that allow mandamus
review of such determinations, litigants will not be assured of an
absolute right to appeal-but may still be able to secure relief through
interlocutory review, depending in some circuits on the importance of
the issues raised, and in others on whether the district court clearly
abused its discretion in making the discovery order.
159. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996); Ken M. Zeidner, Note,
Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work Product Doctrine
for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 1315, 1318-19 (2001) (outlining three divergent approaches to
inadvertent disclosures in the federal courts).
160. See In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 940 (8th Cir. 1994) The court applied the more stringent
"clear abuse of discretion" test, and explained the difference between the two standards of review:
Had the district court applied the correct legal standard but, in the course of applying the
Diversified test, determined that the communications had not satisfied one or more of the five
requirements, we believe that it would have committed reversible error, but that such error
would probably not constitute a clear abuse of discretion.
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III. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuits' varying approaches need to be reconciled. The current
split ensures that some litigants have access to interlocutory review and
relief that others do not, based only on geographic location. The split
may also lead to undesirable consequences if parties know before filing
suit that privilege questions are likely to play a role in the litigation and
therefore attempt to forum shop based on the potential appellate
remedies in certain circuits.
161
The split also leads to unpredictability, both in terms of procedure and
in terms of the substantive law of privilege. Procedurally, a circuit split
"permit[s] unnecessary uncertainty over which interpretation of a federal
law will be applied by a circuit that has not yet ruled on a question."'' 62
In the Eighth Circuit, for example, a party could either pursue
mandamus review, which is available in that circuit if the district court
has committed a clear abuse of discretion,' 63 or it could attempt to appeal
under the Cohen doctrine, which is a more uncertain remedy in the
Eighth Circuit but would require a showing only of ordinary error to
obtain relief.164 In order to play it safe, a party may well choose both to
file a mandamus petition and to attempt an interlocutory appeal, thus
engaging in potentially unnecessary and duplicative efforts simply
because the circuits have split over the proper remedy for erroneous
privilege determinations.
Finally, the uncertainty in review procedures creates uncertainty in
the privileges themselves. Litigants who are afraid they will be bound by
an erroneous disclosure order may be reluctant to engage in frank
attorney-client discussion or other privileged communication. This
161. J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent oflntercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REv. 913, 930 (1983) (asserting that intercircuit conflicts
could "encourage tactical ploys designed to avoid the unfavorable approach of one circuit or take
advantage of the favorable approach of another circuit"); Aaron M. Streett, Can Privilege Rulings
Be Immediately Appealed? Circuits Are Split Over Whether Collateral-Order Doctrine Should
Apply, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 2006, at S6 ("It is unfortunate that something as central to our legal
system as attorney-client confidentiality is protected differently depending on the federal circuit in
which one resides.").
162. Wallace, supra note 161, at 930.
163. See In re Bankamerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Though
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, we will issue the writ when the district court has committed
a clear error of law or abuse of discretion in ordering the disclosure of privileged materials.").
164. See Bomtrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1093 (8th
Cir. 2005) (leaving open the question of whether the Eighth Circuit might be willing to apply the
Cohen doctrine in an appropriate privilege case).
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uncertainty is especially harmful, as parties "must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all.,
165
While the circuit split needs to be resolved, none of the circuits'
current approaches fully realizes the goals of appellate review. Litigation
sanctions are an unreliable method of review, as a litigant cannot predict
whether the court will issue an appealable criminal contempt order or a
nonappealable civil contempt order. 166 District courts rarely grant
permission to pursue a discretionary appeal under § 1292(b), even in
cases where the circuit cases later determine that relief is necessary. 167
The requirements of the Cohen doctrine limit its applicability in civil
cases. 16 8 Finally, mandamus review is not generally available in cases
presenting a close legal question.
169
A. Litigation Sanctions Are an Unreliable Method for Obtaining
Review
Courts that require litigants to risk litigation sanctions in order to
obtain review generally point out that the possibility of such sanctions
"serves efficiency interests" by "encourag[ing] reflection both by the
party seeking discovery and by the party resisting it.',' 170 The U.S.
Supreme Court has therefore required that a party objecting to a
discovery request refuse to comply with a disclosure order in order to
preserve a right to litigate those questions. 171 The Court reasoned that
"unless a party resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in
contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify
interrupting the ongoing proceedings."'
7 2
165. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)).
166. See infra Part III.A.
167. See infra Part III.B.
168. See infra Part III.C.
169. See infra Part III.D.
170. Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 399 F.3d 391, 397 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting FDIC v.
Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454,459 (1st Cir. 2000)).
171. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971).




While risking a contempt judgment may encourage reflection and
demonstrate sincerity, this method of testing a privilege claim has
proved to be somewhat haphazard in practice. Rarely is the denial of
discovery dispositive of the entire case. More often, there will be no
dismissal that can be immediately appealed, and the appellate relief, if
any, must wait until after trial.1 73 Neither are criminal contempt
sanctions or default judgments particularly reliable methods of obtaining
review of disclosure orders; a party resisting discovery cannot be assured
that the district court will sanction it using either of these mechanisms.
Indeed, the district court will usually attempt to compel compliance
through civil contempt before sanctioning the party through criminal
contempt-and unlike criminal contempt judgments, civil contempt is
not generally reviewable until after final judgment. 174 Furthermore, some
non-appealable civil contempt sanctions may be quite severe. For
example, one district court imposed a sanction of $150,000 per day
when IBM refused to turn over material that it believed was protected by
the attorney-client privilege.1 75 Because the sanction was civil rather
than criminal, IBM could not immediately appeal it. 176 At least one court
has noted that the potential severity of sanctions is a strong deterrent to
attempting to vindicate a privilege claim by resisting a discovery
order; 177 the D.C. Circuit has written that sanctions "may be of such
severity that a reasonable party would not risk incurring them, even in
order to preserve a clearly meritorious privilege claim.
1 78
B. Unavailability of Review Through Discretionary Appeals
At first glance, the discretionary appeal process of § 1292(b) appears
to provide a more reliable review mechanism than the litigation
173. See Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 828 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing that orders refusing
to compel the production of documents "are usually routine, non-appealable interlocutory orders,"
but holding that when the denial of motion for discovery was the basis for dismissal it was therefore
reviewable on appeal).
174. 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 2006 ("If a party is found guilty of criminal contempt
for failure to comply with a discovery order, that is a separate proceeding and the contempt
judgment is immediately appealable. If the party is held to be in civil contempt, review must await
final judgment .... ); see also United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 620 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
175. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1973).
176. Id. at 120 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
177. Philip Morris, 314 F.3d at 620.
178. Id.
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sanctions described above. The discretionary appeal process does not
require a litigant to risk imprisonment or large financial penalties in
order to vindicate a privilege claim. But, because district court judges
have been unwilling to certify cases for discretionary review, such
review has not proven to be a workable remedy in practice. 179 On
occasion, this provision has indeed been used to permit immediate
appellate review of a privilege claim.180 But these occasions are rare;
unfortunately, § 1292(b) appears to be significantly underutilized, 8' and,
as long as the agreement of both district and circuit courts is required, it
is likely to remain underutilized. District judges rarely grant certification
under this provision. 182 In fact, one scholar has stated that "by providing
trial courts with a veto over appeals, the certificate requirement has
vastly reduced section 1292(b)'s potential effectiveness as a safety valve
from the rigors of the final judgment rule."' 3 From the district court's
perspective, there is little incentive to certify orders for appeal; an
interlocutory appeal increases the opportunities for reversal and "invites
delay and circuit interference." 184
As a result, district courts rarely certify discovery orders-even in
cases that are later deemed by higher courts to merit interlocutory
review. For example, in Agster, the parties disputed whether a medical
peer review privilege protected a report generated by a company that
provided health services at the county jail.185 Although the district court
refused to certify an interlocutory appeal to resolve the question, the
Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that interlocutory review was necessary
"because significant strategic decisions turn on [the order's] validity,"
and because "review after final judgment may therefore come too
179. See Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 195 (2001); Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 92 (1975) (suggesting the need to relax
the rule of finality by use of a pragmatic approach to the appealability of interlocutory orders).
180. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1980), opinion
supplemented at 628 F.2d 932, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) ("In this 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
interlocutory appeal, we decided whether the plaintiff in a libel suit can compel discovery of the
identity of a confidential source of the journalist defendants. We conclude that he can.");
Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1978).
181. Glynn, supra note 179, at 195 (recognizing that some circuits have held that review under
§ 1292(b) should be granted only in "big or exceptional cases").
182. Id.
183. Redish, supra note 179, at 108-09.
184. Glynn, supra note 179, at 263 n.308.
185. Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 2005).
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late."'186 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the peer review privilege; it did not disagree with the district
court's decision on the merits, but only on the question of interlocutory
appealability. 187  Another district court even denied § 1292(b)
certification on an issue subsequently deemed worthy of review by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Cheney v. United States District Court.'88 The
case involved substantial questions regarding the separation of powers
between the executive and judicial branches of the United States
government when a sitting vice president is a party to the case.'89 When
district courts refuse to allow discretionary review even in cases where
the appellate courts later determine that interlocutory relief is warranted,
it is clear that the current discretionary review practices do not provide
the necessary levels of certainty and predictability to offer effective
appellate relief.
C. Civil Cases Are Often Unable to Meet the Requirements of the
Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine
Given the unreliability of sanctions orders and the unavailability of
discretionary review, it is not surprising that courts have turned to other
mechanisms to provide interlocutory review of discovery orders. In
Agster, for example, when the district court refused to certify a
discretionary appeal, the Ninth Circuit employed the Cohen collateral
order doctrine to review the disclosure order. 190 Nevertheless, as noted
above, the circuits disagree about the propriety of applying the Cohen
doctrine to review privilege determinations.' 9' Based on current U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, it appears that the Cohen collateral order
doctrine cannot provide a consistent mechanism to review disclosure
rulings in civil cases. In criminal cases, however, the doctrine may be
much more effective.
186. Id. (quoting Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir. 2003)).
187. Id. at 839.
188. 542 U.S. 367,401 (2004).
189. Id. at 380-81.
190. Agster, 422 F.3d at 838.
191. See supra Part II.C
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1. Privilege Issues in Civil Cases Are Inseparable from the Merits
Cohen's applicability is limited in civil cases because courts cannot
do a case-by-case analysis of the Cohen prongs; instead, the U.S.
Supreme Court requires that the Cohen factors be analyzed in relation to
a "category" of orders. 92 Thus, the operative inquiry is not whether the
privilege question is important, separable from the merits, and incapable
of review after final judgment in a particular case-rather, the question
is whether these requirements can be met for an entire category of
cases. 93 Courts that have applied Cohen to privilege determinations in
civil cases have generally ignored this directive, analyzing whether
Cohen's requirements are satisfied in a particular case, not whether they
would generally be satisfied in the relevant category of cases. 1
94
When the Cohen requirements are applied to privilege claims as a
category, discovery orders are likely to fail the separability prong of the
Cohen test. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
separability of privilege claims, its probable position can be inferred
from its ruling on the separability of orders disqualifying counsel.' 95 The
Court has concluded that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case
could not meet the separability requirement because, even if the
disqualification question could be separated from the merits of the claim
in that particular case, many disqualification orders could not be.1 96 In
particular, two types of disqualification orders are inextricably
intertwined with the merits. First, orders disqualifying attorneys who
might testify at trial "are inextricable from the merits because they
192. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) ("[T]he issue of
appealability under § 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs,
without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a 'particular injustic[e]'
averted, by a prompt appellate court decision." (alteration in original) (quoting Van Cauwenberghe
v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988))); see also In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that mandamus review was more appropriate than collateral order review because
"[t]here is some question as to whether each and every privilege ruling by a district court
necessitates appellate review").
193. See Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868.
194. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Clearly, the
privilege question is separable from the merits of the underlying case."); Kelly v. Ford Motor Co.,
110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Kelly submits that a determination of the issues of privilege and
work product will in fact implicate the merits of the underlying dispute. We believe that it will
not."); Agster, 422 F.3d at 838 ("[U]nder the specific circumstances of this case, including the
nature and importance of the privilege at issue, jurisdiction lies.").




involve an assessment of the likely course of the trial and the effect of
the attorney's testimony on the judgment."'1 97 Second, disqualification
orders based on attorney misconduct "may be entwined with the merits
of the litigation as well," because "[i]f reversal hinges on whether the
alleged misconduct is 'likely to infect future proceedings,' courts of
appeals will often have to review the nature and content of those
proceedings to determine whether the standard is met."
'1 98
In a civil suit, many discovery orders based on privilege are also
likely to be similarly intertwined with the merits of the claim, and less-
than-absolute privileges especially so. For example, a court considering
whether the governmental deliberative-process privilege applies to
requested information must consider "the relevance of the privileged
evidence, the availability of other evidence, the seriousness of the
litigation, the role of the government in the litigation, and the potentially
chilling effect that disclosure would have upon other government
employees." 199 Likewise, trade secrets and material subject to the work-
product doctrine may often be protected from discovery, but not
absolutely.200 In determining whether a purported trade secret is subject
to discovery, a court must weigh the "claim to privacy against the need
for disclosure., 2 0' Similarly, in determining whether the work-product
doctrine prohibits discovery, a court must determine whether the party
seeking the discovery "is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 20 2 Any inquiry
into the relevance of the discovery to the party's claims, or to the
hardship incurred if the party is denied discovery, requires "an
assessment of the likely course of the trial" and analysis of the "nature
and content" of the party's claims.20 3 Consequently, under the U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, these confidentiality claims are
inextricably intertwined with the merits.20 4
197. Id. (citation omitted).
198. Id. (quoting Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated, 472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985)).
199. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 176 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
200. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979); FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
201. Merrill, 443 U.S. at 362 (quoting advisory committee note to FED. RULE CIV. P. 26).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
203. See Koller, 472 U.S. at 439.
204. Id.
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Even unqualified privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, will
often be intertwined with the merits of a civil claim. Unlike the qualified
privileges discussed above, courts do not balance the attorney-client
privilege against the opposing party's need for the information.2 5
Instead, when the privilege applies, it "affords all communications
between attorney and client absolute and complete protection from
disclosure., 20 6 Nonetheless, courts addressing attorney-client privilege
claims often have to analyze questions of waiver, potentially requiring
some analysis of the merits of the privilege claim. For example, a party
may waive attorney-client privilege by putting the attorney's conduct
into issue, as in a legal malpractice claim.2 °7 In such a case, the court
will not be able to decide whether privilege has been waived without
examining the "nature and content" of the plaintiffs claim to determine
whether the attorney's conduct is truly at issue in the case.2 °8 Similarly,
courts may have to address exceptions to the privilege, such as the
crime-fraud exception that applies when documents sought in discovery
"relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or
ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct., 20 9 When the court is asked to
apply the crime-fraud exception, parties' underlying claims are often
based on the same alleged fraudulent conduct that could support an
exception to the privilege.210 Consequently, the merits of the underlying
action would again often be "intertwined" with the privilege claim.
2. Application of the Cohen Doctrine in Criminal Cases
The Cohen doctrine may be more useful in criminal cases than in civil
cases, as discovery orders are more likely to satisfy the separability
requirement in criminal cases. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, in
a criminal action, Cohen's separability requirement is satisfied if both
the issues sought to be appealed can be analyzed separately from the
merits of the case-that is, the question of whether the defendant is
205. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 600 (4th Cir. 1997).
206. Id.
207. Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2003).
208. Koller, 472 U.S. at 439 (noting that an issue is "entwined with the merits of the litigation" if
the court must examine the "nature and content" of the litigation to resolve it); see also Bittaker,
331 F.3d at 717.
209. Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
210. See, e.g., id.; see also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1992).
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"guilty or innocent of the crimes charged"-and the order is "wholly
separate as well from questions concerning trial procedures.,, 21 1 Thus,
the Court held in Sell v. United States212 that an order requiring a
defendant to take medication in order to become competent to stand trial
was an appealable collateral order under the Cohen doctrine. 2 3 Given
this holding, and given the limited focus of the "merits" inquiry to
questions of guilt or innocence, it is likely that discovery orders will
meet the separability requirement in criminal cases.
Once the separability hurdle has been crossed, it is probable that some
categories of privilege determinations will be able to meet the remaining
Cohen requirements in criminal cases. Orders requiring disclosure of
allegedly privileged information will generally meet the "finality"
requirement, as they "conclusively determine" the question presented.214
Orders meet Cohen's finality requirement if they "are 'made with the
expectation that they will be the final word on the subject addressed.'
21 5
By contrast, orders will fail the finality requirement if they are "the kind
of order[s] that ... a district court ordinarily would expect to reassess
and revise... in response to events occurring 'in the ordinary course of
litigation."'' 216 An order granting discovery cannot generally be
reassessed or revised. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, "once '[t]he cat is
already out of the bag,' it may not be possible to get it back in."21 7 Even
if disclosed documents are destroyed, people will remember what was in
them-information that has been made public can never be truly secret
again. Similarly, an order granting discovery will satisfy the
unreviewability prong because the dissemination of information cannot
be cured on appeal. Regardless of how the appellate court rules, the
disclosed information can no longer be made secret, and a later ruling
that the information was privileged does not cure the harm from its
disclosure.21 8
211. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003).
212. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
213. Id. at 176.
214. Id.; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
215. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277 (1988) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)).
216. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13).
217. Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2003)).
218. Id.
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Cohen's "importance" requirement may be the most difficult for a
discovery order to meet in a criminal case, but even this requirement is
not likely to be insurmountable for some limited categories of privilege
determinations. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "'important' in
Cohen's sense" means being "weightier than the societal interests
advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles., 219 The
"importance" requirement is more difficult to meet in criminal trials than
it is in civil trials because there is a more "compelling interest in prompt
trials" in criminal cases. 220 Interest in a speedy trial does not belong to
the defendant alone; instead, courts have held that "the public has as
great an interest in a prompt criminal trial as has the defendant. 21
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the "rule of
finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions because
'encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal
law. '
222
Even given the strictness of the "importance" requirement in criminal
cases, however, it may be satisfied in certain circumstances. In Sell, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an order requiring a criminal
defendant to be forcibly medicated in order to become competent to
stand trial could be immediately appealed;223 the Court noted that
"involuntary medical treatment raises questions of clear constitutional
importance. 224 The Court has also allowed the immediate appeals of
denials of motions to reduce bail,225 denials of motions to dismiss for
double jeopardy,226 and denials of motions to dismiss under the Speech
or Debate Clause.227 In each of these cases, the Court determined that the
importance of the rights asserted outweighed the delay caused by the
interlocutory appeal.
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence, it seems
likely that certain categories of discovery orders could meet the Cohen
requirements in criminal cases. A defendant's claim of attorney-client
219. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994).
220. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984).
221. United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 360 (2d Cir. 1995).
222. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978) (quoting Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)).
223. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003).
224. Id.
225. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951).
226. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
227. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 507 (1979).
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privilege, for example, may meet all three requirements. First, a ruling
requiring the defendant to disclose allegedly confidential information is
final because, once disclosed, the district court cannot reconsider its
decision and order that the information be restored to secrecy. 8 Second,
the privilege can be analyzed without regard to the defendant's guilt or
innocence.229 Third, the attorney-client privilege protects an important
right to confer openly with counsel, and thus implicates the right to the
effective assistance of counsel in a criminal case. 230  Finally, the
disclosure cannot be corrected on appeal. Even if the appellate court
orders a new trial at which the information is not used, the defendant
will still be "irremediably disadvantaged by erroneous disclosure,"
because the prosecutors "'cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to
them' . . . [and] are likely to use such material for evidentiary leads,
strategy decisions, or the like. 2 31 Any other categories of privilege
deemed sufficiently important to outweigh the risk of a delay in trial
might also qualify for interlocutory review under Cohen.
232
D. Limitations of Mandamus Review
Some courts have chosen to review disclosure orders through
mandamus. For example, when the district court in Cheney refused to
authorize a discretionary appeal,233 the U.S. Supreme Court granted
mandamus relief.234 But even though some courts have expanded
mandamus review to routinely consider privilege questions, mandamus
is not a reliable remedy.
228. See In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
229. Cf Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (noting that Cohen's separability
requirement is met in a criminal case when a collateral issue does not relate to the question of
whether the defendant "is guilty or innocent of the crimes charged").
230. Cf, e.g., Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1966); United States v. Rosner, 485
F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he essence of the Sixth Amendment right is, indeed, privacy of
communication with counsel.").
231. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)) (concluding that "there is no way
to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure").
232. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978) (noting that the importance
prong is the most stringent of the Cohen requirements in criminal cases).
233. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 233 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31 (D.D.C.
2002), rev'd sub nom. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 392 (2004) (holding that the
"defendants have not met their burden of establishing that exceptional circumstances justifying
interlocutory appeal exist under the standard set forth by § 1292(b)").
234. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 392.
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Mandamus procedures are designed to handle clear-cut violations of
well-established law, not to resolve difficult legal questions. As the Fifth
Circuit has pointed out:
[M]andamus... is singularly inappropriate to determine the
correctness of a controlling question of law "as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion." These
extraordinary writs are generally directed toward situations so
bold and plain that the trial Judge's actions are examined in the
light of the presence or lack of an abuse of discretion.235
Judge Posner has also expressed concern that mandamus may be
overused, asking: "How to cabin this too-powerful writ which if
uncabined threatens to unravel the final-decision rule? '236 Judge
Posner's answer to his own question was to "tak[e] seriously the two
conditions for the grant of a writ of mandamus": irreparable harm and
clear abuse of discretion.237 It is apparent that some courts have ignored
the "clear abuse of discretion" requirement in privilege cases. 23
8
E. Summary
The circuit courts have adopted widely divergent requirements for
reviewing disclosure orders, and this circuit split has led to both
procedural unpredictability and substantive uncertainty. None of the
current approaches, however, appear able to provide a mechanism for
consistent review. Parties may reasonably be unwilling to risk severe
litigation sanctions, trial courts have been reluctant to certify
discretionary appeals, Cohen's separability requirements make it
inappropriate to resolve privilege questions in civil cases, and mandamus
review is inappropriate in cases not presenting a clear-cut abuse of
discretion.
IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PROPOSED STATUTE
OR RULE CHANGES
The confusion over interlocutory review has not gone unnoticed.
Commentators seem to agree that the methods of interlocutory review
are inadequate and that courts need to adopt a new approach if litigants
235. Exparte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963).
236. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 143-160 and accompanying text.
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are to be given an effective remedy for erroneous disclosure orders.239
Each of these proposals offers suggestions for improvement, but none of
the proposals meet all three of the basic goals of appellate review-
(1) increasing the probability of a correct judgment; (2) providing
uniformity of result; and (3) increasing litigants' sense that their dispute
has been fully and fairly heard-without imposing unmanageable
burdens on the judicial system. 240
Proposals seeking to clarify and unify interlocutory review tend to
require changes in a statute or rule.241 They also tend to fall into one of
two broad categories: (1) increasing the number of appeals allowed as of
right; 242  or (2) allowing the circuit courts full discretion over
interlocutory appeals.243 Some proposals include a combination of the
two categories.
A. Additional Appeals as of Right
Some scholars have recommended that the U.S. Supreme Court adopt
rules allowing appeals as of right in certain categories of cases.244
Professor Timothy Glynn, for example, has recommended adopting a
rule that would allow an appeal as of right for some categories of cases,
potentially including "certain orders that deny protection for allegedly
privileged or otherwise protected communications or information. ' 245 He
notes that privilege determinations comprise a "problem
area... governed by unclear legal standards and encompass[ing] orders
239. See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
240. Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1175 (1990); see also Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 642.
241. See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
242. Glynn, supra note 179, at 262; Turk, supra note 20, at 1038.
243. A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMm, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12 (1977) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing
the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J.
200 (1994); Solimine, supra note 240; Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Prr. L. REv. 717, 747 (1993); Howard B.
Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to
Change the Rules, I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 301 (1999).
244. The U.S. Supreme Court has this power under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title [28 U.S.C.],
to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise
provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."
245. Glynn, supra note 179, at 259.
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that usually inflict severe irreparable harm. 246 Broadened mandatory
review, he asserts, "will immediately increase error correction and harm
avoidance opportunities, and significant, even-handed appellate attention
over time will make governing standards within the area clearer, thereby
reducing the frequency of error."
247
It may be true that mandatory review of privilege determinations
could increase error correction and avoid the irreparable harm caused by
an erroneous order requiring disclosure. But the harm caused by
allowing appeals of right of every potentially erroneous disclosure order
almost certainly outweighs the benefit of increased error correction.
Currently, the district courts deal with many more claims of privilege
than the appellate courts do, and develop and apply legal principles long
before the circuit courts have a chance to do so.
248
Injecting appellate courts into the routine review of privilege rulings
will therefore have a significant impact on the workload of those
courts-and the amount of increased work will not necessarily be offset
by a reduction in appeals caused by the clarification of privilege law.
Under most of the current modes of review, courts can consider the
importance of a particular issue before deciding whether interlocutory
review will be available. 249 Taking the importance prong out of the
equation will open the appellate courts to a much wider group of
appeals. If, for example, privilege rulings are repeatedly appealed not
because there is disagreement over a fundamental legal principle, but
rather because the parties merely disagree with the district court's
findings of fact or application of the law, then appellate courts might
find themselves in the very situation the Second Circuit warned of-
engaged in relatively insignificant "housekeeping" matters that detract
from the amount of time available to consider more compelling
questions. 50 In this situation, an appeal of right would be an
overinclusive remedy; although it might catch and correct some
important errors, it would likely sweep too many cases into its scope,
and thus create a bigger burden than exists under the current system.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 786 n.123 (2002) (noting that district courts
had applied-and rejected--one circuit's interpretation of the attorney-client privilege before other
circuits had a chance to consider it).
249. See supra Parts ll.B., I.C., and lI.D.
250. Am. Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Furthermore, even if an appeal of right could be limited to certain
frequently questioned categories, it would still be difficult to define each
category "broadly enough to capture the entire problem area, yet
narrowly enough not to impose an unmanageable additional burden on
circuit courts."251 With regard to privilege determinations, it is probably
impossible to identify a category that "capture[s] the entire problem
area" without "impos[ing] an unmanageable additional burden. 2 52
Consequently, categorical limitations of privilege appeals are unlikely to
solve the overinclusivity problems described above, and may even inject
a significant element of underinclusivity. Examining the privilege cases
that appellate courts have previously found worthy of interlocutory
review, it is clear that these cases range over a number of broad subject
areas, including attorney-client privilege, 53  trade secrets,254
governmental privilege,255 and others.256 A rule that was limited to only
one of these categories would be significantly underinclusive, because it
would leave out many cases in which the risk of irreparable harm is just
as high, and in which the need to settle the law is just as great. At the
same time, a rule allowing appeal in even one category may still be
overinclusive; it is unlikely that every order requiring disclosure of an
alleged trade secret, for example, is worthy of immediate review.
2 57
B. Lodging Discretionary Review in the Circuit Courts
Given the difficulties with defining possible categories for appeals as
of right, it is not surprising that a number of scholars and practitioners
have instead recommended that courts retain some discretion over which
cases they review. Because the district courts' reluctance to certify
discretionary appeals has limited the use of § 1292(b), scholars have
recommended removing district courts from the equation and instead
providing the circuit courts with greater discretion over selecting which
251. Glynn, supra note 179, at 261.
252. Id.
253. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997).
254. Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989).
255. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974).
256. Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 361 (1982) (census data privilege); Agster v. Maricopa
County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005) (peer review privilege); Usery v. Ritter, 547 F.2d 528,
529 (10th Cir. 1977) (informers' privilege).
257. See, e.g., Griego v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 531, 533 (D.S.C. 1998) (concluding that
there was no basis to dispute that the discovery at issue was not protected by South Carolina's Trade
Secrets Act).
Washington Law Review
interlocutory appeals to hear.258 The American Bar Association (ABA),
for example, has proposed a discretionary system that entirely excludes
district courts from the decision of whether a matter is appropriate for
interlocutory review, simply lodging complete discretionary review with
the appellate courts.259 Professors Eisenberg and Morrison have written
in support of the ABA proposal, concluding that it offers a solution to
the recalcitrance of district courts to certify discretionary appeals when
"interlocutory appeals are appropriate but not now available."
260
In theory, fully discretionary review would be preferable to
mandatory review because it would be neither underinclusive nor
overinclusive; the circuit courts could choose to hear only the cases in
which the threat of irreparable harm is greatest, and in which the district
courts are in need of the most guidance. In practice, however,
discretionary review is likely to create nearly as large a burden on
appellate courts as mandatory review; the courts would need to review
every request for review, even those that are subsequently denied. With
discretionary review available in potentially every case involving
privilege claims, it is likely that a large number of petitions for
discretionary review would be filed with each circuit court.
Eisenberg and Morrison suggest that the courts' workload should not
increase too dramatically because "there will be no law to research, and
the judges.. . should be able to read the papers quite quickly and make
an informed judgment about whether the case warrants an exception to
the final judgment rule. 261  However, this approach dismisses too
quickly the impact that such a discretionary system would have on the
appellate court's workload; it seems unrealistic, at the least, to think that
there would be "no law to research." A prime example of the research
that judges would still need to do can be seen in the appeals of class-
action certification orders, where the appellate courts have been given
258. Either a rule change or an amendment to the discretionary appeal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), could accomplish this goal. See Solimine, supra note 240, 1209-12,
259. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 243, § 3.12, at 25. Wisconsin currently follows this approach:
A judgment or order not appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be appealed to the
court of appeals in advance of a final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if it
determines that an appeal will: (a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or
clarify further proceedings in the litigation; (b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or
irreparable injury; or (c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration ofjustice.
WIs. STAT. § 808.03(2) (2005).
260. Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 243, at 301.
261. Id. at 302.
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full discretion to determine which cases to hear.262 Even if there were no
statutes or rules actually restricting the appellate court's choice of which
cases to decide on interlocutory appeal, the judges would still do
significant amounts of research in determining whether the case merits
the court's discretionary review.263 For example, the judges would be
likely to research whether the case presented a scenario that arose
frequently, and whether courts had previously handled the matter
inconsistently. Furthermore, the courts would be likely to do at least
some research into the merits of the underlying privilege claim; if the
appellate court believed the district court to be correct on the merits,
there would be less incentive to grant review. Most commentators agree
that appellate judges are diligent and take their responsibilities
seriously; 264 consequently, the additional workload even in a fully
discretionary system is likely to be greater than suggested by its
proponents.
Finally, the existence of complete discretion may preclude uniformity
among the circuits. If there is truly "no law" restricting "whether [a] case
warrants an exception to the final judgment rule," then each circuit court
would be likely to apply its own criteria for choosing cases to review.
Without statutory or rule-based guidelines to establish uniformity, it is
likely that those criteria would differ among the circuits. Lacking
guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court could not review the choices made
by circuit courts, thus rendering the circuit courts' decisions effectively
unreviewable and irreversible.265 Thus, while the appellate courts might
ensure that there was uniformity within a circuit, they would be unable
to ensure that there would be uniformity among the circuits; in that
situation, just as under the current split, some litigants would have
262. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0.
263. See, e.g., In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 102-06 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 138-43 (2d Cir.
2001); Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1272-75 (11th Cir. 2000); Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293-95 (1st Cir. 2000). These cases all included
significant legal research in determining whether to exercise the court's discretion to allow an
interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
264. See, e.g., David Greenwald and Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1133, 1166 (2002) (noting that federal appellate judges are "qualified and hard-
working," and pointing out that the average judge authors approximately "54 published majority
opinions each year").
265. See Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 638-41.
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access to interlocutory review and relief that others did not, based only
266
on geographic location.
C. Combining Categorization with Discretion
Another possible solution is to combine increased discretion with an
increase in the number of categories in which a litigant may take an
interlocutory appeal. Professor Glynn has suggested such an approach in
his proposal to amend the rules of civil procedure to combine categories
of potential interlocutory appeals with discretionary review.267 Under
this proposal, the rules would include expanded categories for
interlocutory appeals, as described above. However, rather than
providing an appeal of right for cases falling within those categories,
there would instead be only a discretionary appeal. Specifically, the
district court would certify an interlocutory appeal when the law is
"unsettled within the circuit" and "necessary to the disposition" of the
interlocutory order.268 The district court's certification order would be
"subject to abuse of discretion review" by the appellate court, which
would "provide some check" against the district court's disincentive to
certify an interlocutory appeal.269 Professor Glynn argues that it would
give the district court "narrower" and "clearer" criteria to consider when
making the certification decision.27°
This proposal avoids the workload pressures that would be created by
lodging full discretion in the appellate courts. If the categories of
appealable orders are defined broadly enough-for example, if a
category is created to encompass all orders that "deny protection for
allegedly privileged or otherwise protected communications or
information"27 '-then a district court's exercise of its discretion can be
targeted at the particular disclosure orders that warrant review. At least
within the enumerated categories, litigants would have a uniform method
of review and courts would have only a limited increase in their
workloads.
Although this proposal could achieve greater uniformity in providing
appellate review of discovery orders, it does have a number of
266. See supra Part Ill.
267. Glynn, supra note 179, at 262.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 264.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 259.
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drawbacks. First, the requirement that the law be "unsettled within the
circuit ' '272 ignores the possibility that the law may be unsettled among
the circuits-and thus excludes the possibility that the U.S. Supreme
Court might ultimately review the order. Second, and more important,
the proposal requires a rule change, but offers little benefit that is not
already found in the § 1292(b) discretionary appeal. It is argued that the
proposal allows the appellate court to review the district court's
certification decision for an abuse of discretion.273 However, as I discuss
below, the current statutory scheme also allows such appellate review of




Scholars have crafted proposals to provide greater interlocutory
review of disclosure orders. These proposals include allowing additional
appeals as of right, lodging discretionary review in the circuit courts of
appeals, and combining appeals of right with appellate court
discretionary review. Attempting to define the categories in which an
appeal as of right may be taken is a difficult process, and is likely to be
both underinclusive (leaving out important categories) and overinclusive
(including unimportant cases within a larger category). Lodging
complete discretion in the appellate courts is likely to create a
significantly burdensome workload. Finally, these proposals all require
revisions to the procedural rules; none of them present a feasible
solution under the current regulatory scheme.
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER UNIFORMITY UNDER THE
CURRENT RULES AND STATUTORY SCHEME
I propose that the goals of error correction, uniformity, and fairness
can best be met by combining two of the current methods of review-
discretionary review and mandamus. No revision to the procedural rules
is required. As discussed above, the interlocutory review of privilege
determinations is an area sorely in need of unifying principles.275
However, I do not believe that the statutory or rule changes addressed
272. Id. at 262.
273. Id. at 264.
274. See infra Part V.
275. See supra Parts III and IV.
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above are desirable given their likely impact on the appellate courts'
workload and their failure to narrowly address the most pressing
privilege issues. Instead, I recommend that appellate courts address the
inconsistencies in interlocutory review by taking a different analytic
approach to the current scheme-specifically, by using the appellate
court's mandamus power to enforce the district court's compliance with
the discretionary review statute.
This two-tiered review mechanism need not be applied to review
every disclosure order, as the current system appears to address certain
cases reasonably well. In the criminal context, for example, interlocutory
review is available only rarely, as the right to a speedy trial usually
outweighs the benefits of interlocutory review.2 76 However, when
important rights are in danger of being lost without such review, the
Cohen collateral order doctrine provides a sufficient safeguard.277 The
current system also works well for situations in which a district court
orders disclosure of information without any regard to the law or to
guiding principles-this is the type of clear abuse of discretion that
mandamus review was established to address.278
The current system breaks down, however, in addressing privilege
questions of first impression in civil cases-and in these cases, the
proposed approach could fill in the gaps and provide consistent appellate
review. Appellate courts struggle to find a way to provide immediate
review in these cases because: (1) the party ordered to disclose
privileged information is likely to be irreparably harmed if review must
wait until after a final judgment,279 and (2) the issue may escape review
altogether if the privilege question becomes moot after a final judgment
because the information has already been disclosed.2 80 However, courts
have found that the established methods of interlocutory review do not
always work in this category of cases; district courts may fail to certify a
discretionary appeal, 28 ' and Cohen's separability requirement can
foreclose appeal under the collateral order doctrine.282 When the legal
issues are unsettled, it can be difficult to conclude that a district court
276. See supra Part II.C.3.
277. See supra Part III.C.3.
278. See supra Part IID; Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).
279. See supra Part 1.
280. See supra Part 1.
281. See supra Part IlI.B.
282. See supra Part III.C.1.
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has committed a "clear abuse of discretion" in attempting to apply the
law as the court sees it, and courts may therefore be tempted to dispense
with this requirement.283 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that such a clear abuse of discretion is a necessary
predicate to mandamus review, and its most recent writing on the subject
does not suggest that there is an exception for questions of first
impression.284 In spite of these problems, however, I believe that a
combination of discretionary appeal and mandamus review can provide
a workable solution.
A. Enforcing § 1292(b) Through Mandamus Review
Section 1292(b), although currently underutilized, provides an
excellent mechanism for resolving privilege disputes before final
judgment. Parties who believe that the district court made an error of law
in a privilege ruling should ask the district court to certify a discretionary
appeal, and the circuit courts should encourage the district courts to use
this mechanism whenever possible. Section 1292(b) is tailor-made for
handling difficult and novel questions of law that would otherwise evade
review, and privilege orders can generally meet its requirements.285
Scholars have pointed out that the problems with § 1292(b) lie with
district courts' unwillingness to embrace the statute, and not with the
statute itself 2 86 Therefore, if § 1292(b) is to live up to its potential, the
appellate courts must have a mechanism to ensure that district judges are
not overly recalcitrant to apply it in appropriate cases.2 87 If a disclosure
order clearly meets the requirements set out in § 1292(b) and the district
court nevertheless refuses to certify it for interlocutory appeal, the
appellate court should consider whether the district court has clearly
abused its discretion in refusing to certify the case. If the appellate court
determines that it has, mandamus review would then be appropriate to
ensure that the purpose of § 1292(b) is not thwarted.
In the past, courts have been reluctant to conclude that a district court
could ever abuse its discretion by refusing to certify an interlocutory
appeal. This reluctance does not derive from the statute itself, the plain
283. See supra Part 1I.D.2.
284. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
286. See Glynn, supra note 179, at 195 (noting that district judges "rarely grant certification
under this provision"); Redish, supra note 179, at 92.
287. See supra Part II.B.
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language of § 1292(b) lodges unlimited discretion only in the appellate
court, not the district court.288 The statute provides that the circuit court
"may... in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order,"
but also provides that "[w]hen a district judge... shall be of the opinion
[that the order meets the appealability criteria], he shall so state in
writing. '289 The district court's "opinion" in this matter cannot be a
matter of mere subjective preference, because the statute provides the
court a framework by which to make its conclusion: the court must make
a legal and factual determination as to: (1) whether there is a
"controlling question of law," (2) whether there is "substantial ground
for difference of opinion," and (3) whether an immediate appeal might
"materially advance" the litigation. 290 Thus, the court's "opinion" is
intended to be a reasonable determination about whether the
appealability criteria have been met. Nonetheless, some courts have
concluded that "the language of section 1292(b)" is "not decisive," and
have therefore ignored the statutory language in favor of legislative
history suggesting that "district court judges retain unfettered discretion
to deny certification of an order for interlocutory appeal even where the
three legislative criteria of section 1292(b) appear to be met., 291 This
legislative history, however, is irrelevant in the face of an unambiguous
29statute, 92 and the text of the statute simply does not give the district
court unlimited discretion.
In fact, the statute offers a carefully crafted mix of direction and
discretion. It offers direction by expressing an intent to permit an
interlocutory appeal when judicial efficiency would benefit from it, that
is, when there is a controlling question of law, a substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and the possibility of materially advancing the
litigation. 93 Thus, § 1292(b) charges district courts with evaluating the
state of the case and making a determination about the likely effect of an
288. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
289. Id. (emphasis added).
290. Id.
291. Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 139, 162
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13-14 (D.N.J. 2001).
292. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004) ("[O]ur longstanding
precedents ... permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous
statutory text."); Conn. Nat'l. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also
the last: judicial inquiry is complete.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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interlocutory appeal. But it also allows the circuit courts to exercise their
discretion in deciding which interlocutory appeals to accept. Thus, if the
docket becomes too crowded or if there are other compelling reasons not
to accept an interlocutory appeal, an adequate safety valve exists.
Some courts have suggested that the statute's "dual gatekeeper"
structure requires the district court also to have unfettered discretion to
deny certification, and that "[i]f someone disappointed in the district
court's refusal to certify a case under § 1292(b) has only to go to the
court of appeals for a writ of mandamus requiring such a certification,
there will be only one gatekeeper, and the statutory system will not
operate as designed., 294 This view is shortsighted. Allowing the
appellate court to review the district court's decision does not create a
one-gatekeeper system; instead, it merely allows the second gatekeeper
to ensure that the first gatekeeper is functioning adequately and fairly,
just as an appellate court does in any case. In fact, if the appellate court
cannot review the district court's decision at all, then the dual gatekeeper
system truly cannot function, because no matter how derelict the first
gatekeeper may be, the second gatekeeper would never have the
opportunity to offer its guidance. Judicially creating a second layer of
absolute discretion for district courts therefore actually disrupts the
balance crafted by the statute, as it allows district courts to cut off the
discretionary review mechanism before the appellate court even has a
chance to consider whether the case is worthy of immediate review.
Mandamus review is therefore appropriate (1) when the district court
concludes that the conditions of § 1292(b) are met but nevertheless
refuses to certify the case,295 or (2) when the state of the record is such
that the district court must reasonably conclude that the prerequisites
have been satisfied. A few of the circuit courts have expressed a
296
willingness to exercise their mandamus power in this situation,
294. In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Note, Interlocutory
Appeals in the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 616-17 (1975).
295. For example, in National Asbestos Workers the district court was willing to assume without
deciding that "section 1292(b)'s explicit requirements [were] satisfied," but nevertheless concluded
that certification of an interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because "unique factual and legal
issues" required "highly fact specific inquiries." 71 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
296. See Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 431 (11th Cir. 1982); see also In re Lott, 424
F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2005) ("When there is extraordinary need for review of an order before final
judgment and the District Court has refused to certify the issue pursuant to § 1292(b), this Court has
authority to issue a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act."); In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d at
654 ("[W]e have not ruled out the possibility of a writ of mandamus in the § 1292(b) context for a
truly egregious situation, if it seemed that the district court was seriously abusing its authority."); In
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although others have not.297 When an appellate court does exercise
mandamus review after a district court has wrongly refused to certify an
appeal, the appellate court need not remand for certification, as this
would cause needless delay; instead, the court should proceed directly to
consider the merits of the privilege question.298
B. Advantages of Two-Tiered Review Combining a § 1292(b) Appeal
with Mandamus Review
Two-tiered review combining § 1292(b) appeal and mandamus would
provide greater uniformity among the circuit courts. It can be applied by
courts immediately, it is consistent with the current statutory and
common-law scheme, and it would not require any statutory or rule
changes. It would also reduce the appellate courts' current reliance on
inconsistent remedies, but would not overly burden the courts' already-
crowded dockets.
1. Reducing Reliance on Inconsistent Appellate Remedies
Enforcing the certification of appropriate § 1292(b) orders through
mandamus review would transform § 1292(b) from a significantly
underutilized statute into an effective appellate remedy, and would thus
allow circuits to minimize some of their current inconsistent approaches
to the review of privilege orders. Because there would be an effective
option for seeking interlocutory review, parties would not need to face
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1167 (5th Cir. 1987) ("An unsuccessful
defendant may seek certification for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), or if
this is denied, the defendant can petition this court for a writ of mandamus.").
297. See Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 698 (9th Cir. 1977); Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Nor is mandamus to direct the
district judge to exercise his discretion to certify the question an appropriate remedy."); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 (2d Cit. 1972) ("Defendants' request that
we mandamus him to certify the issue meets an insurmountable obstacle. Congress plainly intended
that an appeal under § 1292(b) should lie only when the district court and the court of appeals
agreed on its propriety. It would wholly frustrate this scheme if the court of appeals could coerce
decision by the district judge."); D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 374 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cit. 1967)
("Finally, we cannot conceive that we would ever mandamus a district judge to certify an appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in plain violation of the Congressional purpose that such appeals should
be heard only when both the courts concerned so desire.").
298. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.2215], at 287 (2d ed. 1996) ("If a § 1292(b) certificate
is sought and denied, mandamus will then lie in an appropriate case, not to compel issuance of the
certificate, but to review the order for which the certificate was sought."); see also In re Ford Motor
Co., 344 F.3d at 654.
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the risk of incurring severe or unreviewable sanctions for disobeying a
discovery order.299 Similarly, the circuit courts would not need to stretch
the Cohen doctrine to allow appeals as of right in privilege cases, 300 but
could instead reserve Cohen appeals for those orders that are truly
separable from the merits.
Courts could also scale back their use of mandamus review in
privilege cases, providing such review only when the U.S. Supreme
Court's requirement of a "clear abuse of discretion '30 1 or "usurpation of
power"302 is satisfied. Ideally, the circuit courts would no longer grant
mandamus review just because a disclosure order presented an issue of
first impression or created a risk of irreparable harm, but would also
consider whether the parties could have sought certification of an
interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). In this manner, courts could
reserve mandamus relief for cases in which the district court had either
clearly abused its discretion in the first instance by patently ignoring
settled law or, conversely, just as clearly abused its discretion by
refusing to certify an order presenting an obviously important and
unsettled legal question whose resolution would expedite the end of the
lawsuit. Adoption of the proposed two-tiered procedure would therefore
allow mandamus to be limited only to cases meeting the U.S. Supreme
Court's requirements.30 3
2. Minimizing the Appellate Burden
Implementing a two-tiered system of review would divide the
workload between the district court and the appellate court. By seeking a
certification order first in the district court, parties will minimize the
burden placed on appellate courts-ideally, the appellate courts will not
be presented with an interlocutory appeal of a disclosure order until the
district court has vetted the issue and determined that it is worthy of
immediate review. Even when a party seeks mandamus review of a trial
court's refusal to certify an order, the appellate court will have the
benefit of a record that establishes what arguments the district court was
presented with, and its reasoning for refusing to certify. Because the
299. See supra Part H.A.
300. See supra Part IIC.
301. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)).
302. Id. (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)).
303. See id.
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district court would provide the initial screening, the two-tiered system
would place less of a burden on the appellate courts than would a system
that lodged first-line review in the circuit courts.3 °4
C. Limitations of Two-Tiered Review
Even if the appellate courts begin enforcing the certification
provisions of § 1292(b), there will still be some privilege orders capable
of inflicting irreparable injury that will not be subject to appellate review
under this section. First, by its terms, the statute applies only to civil
305 ol o
actions, so it would not be available in a criminal case. Second, it
would not apply to cases in which the privilege order turns on a factual
question, rather than a significant question of law.306 Finally, because the
circuit courts would continue to have unfettered discretion to deny an
interlocutory appeal certified by the district court, it is possible that the
courts could deny review of important cases due to the crowded
condition of appellate dockets.3 °7
These limitations are not fatal to the recommendation, however. In
criminal cases, interlocutory review is rarely appropriate, and, on the
rare occasions that it is, review may be available under the Cohen
collateral order doctrine.30 8 In civil cases where the privilege orders do
not meet the "controlling legal issue test," review may still be
occasionally appropriate directly through mandamus3 9-for example,
review would be appropriate if the district court simply ignored clearly
binding precedent in ordering that documents be disclosed.310
Even under the proposed system, however, there will be some cases
in which the harm caused by an erroneous privilege order still goes
unredressed, especially if the privilege determination is particularly fact-
based. For example, a trial court's determination that a party failed to
304. See supra Part IV.B.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
306. Id.
307. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) ("The appellate court may
deny the appeal for any reason, including docket congestion.").
308. See supra Part II.C.3.
309. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 462 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996) ("It is conceivable
that mandamus might be appropriate in a case not satisfying the section 1292(b) certification
standard. Thus, we have not imposed an inflexible requirement that certification be sought and, if
granted, leave to appeal be sought before a writ of mandamus may issue." (internal citations
omitted)).
310. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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introduce factual evidence to support the existence of a privilege may be
unreviewable under either § 1292(b), mandamus, or the Cohen collateral
order doctrine. 311 However, such fact-based cases do not present the type
of issues that have currently divided the circuits and, in fact, are also
likely to go unreviewed in the current system.31 2 Leaving some cases
unreviewed does not conflict with the purpose of the proposal; the point
is not to increase the total number of disclosure orders reviewed, but is
instead to provide greater consistency in those that are reviewed. Under
the proposed system, courts of appeals might review the same total
number of cases. But in cases like Agster and Cheney, when the
appellate courts are determined to provide some type of interlocutory
review, they would have a consistent method by which to do so without
stretching the limits of the collateral order doctrine or mandamus
doctrine. In addition, many of the decisions that would go unreviewed
under both the current system and the proposed system depend on
questions of fact, and are thus unlikely to settle important questions of
law. The burden of reviewing such cases would appear to exceed the
benefits.31 3 Consequently, the exclusion of such cases is not likely to
diminish the benefits of the proposed two-tiered system of review.
D. Summary
In the past, litigants have been unable to rely on discretionary appeals
to remedy erroneous disclosure orders because the district courts have
been reluctant to certify such appeals, even in cases where the appellate
courts later determined that review was warranted. This Article
recommends that appellate courts use their mandamus powers to ensure
that district courts certify discretionary appeals when a disclosure order
meets the requirements of the discretionary appeal statute and thus
qualifies for interlocutory review. This two-tiered system of review does
not require a statute or rule change, and does not require stretching the
boundaries of the Cohen collateral order doctrine or mandamus review
in order to provide review of privilege claims. It does, however, further
311. See In re Toy, 102 F. App'x 657, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying mandamus relief in a fact-
specific case that would also be unlikely to qualify for review under the proposed two-tiered
system).
312. See, e.g., id.
313. Reise v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that, for the typical discretionary discovery order, "the costs of delay via appeal, and the costs to the
judicial system of entertaining these appeals, exceed in the aggregate the costs of the few erroneous
discovery orders that might be corrected were appeals available").
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the goals of appellate review-it provides a second level of review, thus
allowing reversal of erroneous orders; it enhances consistency and
uniformity, as its reliability reduces the incentive for appellate courts to
reach for often-conflicting methods of review; and it increases the
perception of fairness, as litigants' privilege claims can be fully aired
and reviewed before disclosure. Moreover, because the district courts
provide the first level of review, the two-tiered system is unlikely to
impose an unmanageable burden on the appellate docket.
CONCLUSION
Litigants face a difficult situation when a district court orders them to
disclose information they believe to be privileged or confidential. While
other claims can be reviewed after final judgment, privilege claims
cannot wait, and must be reviewed before the information is disclosed.
The current approaches to interlocutory review, however, are both
haphazard and ineffective. This Article therefore proposes a system of
two-tiered review to remedy the harm caused by erroneous disclosure
orders without stretching the current system of interlocutory review so
far that the benefits of the final judgment rule become lost. Review
should begin in the district court with a motion to certify a discretionary
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). If the district court refuses to certify
an order in spite of the fact that it clearly satisfies the requirements of
§ 1292(b), then the appellate court may exercise its mandamus power to
review the case. This two-tiered system of review would provide a
consistent mechanism by which the most difficult and important
privilege orders could be immediately reviewed, but would not impose
too heavy a burden on the already-crowded appellate dockets.
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